



Fiscal Affairs Department

Rationale for, and Design of, Forest Carbon Feebates


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Fiscal Mechanisms for a Sustainable Forest Sector,
Washington, DC, October 24-25, 2018




Potential Contribution of Forests to Climate Stabilization

Global CO2 Emissions
Share, 2014



Global Mitigation Share,
2015-2100



Sources:
IPCC (2014),
Mendelsohn
et al. (2012)

Large Forestry Emitters will need Mitigation Instruments

Country	Paris mitigation pledge ^a	Objectives and measures for forestry	Percent of global CO ₂ from deforestation, 2001-2013
Brazil	Reduce GHGs 37% below 2005 by 2025.	Zero illegal deforestation by 2030; restoring and reforesting 12 million hectares of forests by 2030	45.5
Indonesia	Reduce GHGs 29% (41%) below BAU in 2030 by 2030.	Ban on primary forest clearance; reduce deforestation/degradation; restore ecosystem functions; sustainable forest management.	9.0
Colombia	Reduce GHGs 20% (30%) below BAU by 2030.	Reduce deforestation; preserve important ecosystems.	3.4
Bolivia	Increase renewable energy share to 79% in 2030 (relative to 29% in 2010).	Zero illegal deforestation by 2020; increase forest coverage to 4.5 million hectares by 2030; increase sustainable forestry management.	3.1
Madagascar	Reduce GHGs (32%) below BAU by 2030 with over half of reduction from forestry.	Reforestation for sustainable timber production and species conservation; reduction of forest timber extraction; agroforestry.	2.3
Peru	Reduce GHGs 20% (30%) below BAU in 2030 by 2030.	Measures to promote forest carbon storage not specified.	2.1
Mexico	Reduce GHGs 25% (40%) below BAU in 2030 by 2030.	Measures to promote forest carbon storage not specified.	2.0
Malaysia	Reduce GHG/GDP intensity 35% (45%) by 2030 relative to 2005.	Measures to promote forest carbon storage not specified.	1.9
Paraguay	Reduce GHGs 10% (20%) below BAU in 2030 by 2030.	Measures to promote forest carbon storage not specified.	1.7
Myanmar	Targets for renewables and energy efficiency.	Increase protected/reserved forest cover to 30% of land area through REDD+ related actions.	1.7
Ecuador	Reduce energy GHGs 20.4-25% (37.5-45.8%) below BAU in 2025.	Reforest 100,000 hectares per year to 2025.	1.5
Cambodia	Reduce GHGs (10%) below 2010 levels by 2030.	Increase forest coverage to 60% of land area by 2030.	1.5
Laos	Expand renewables; displace residential biomass burning through electrification.	Increase forest cover to 70% of land area by 2020	1.5

Source: UNFCCC.

Notes. ^aWhere applicable, more ambitious targets conditional on external finance are in parentheses.

Promising Instrument for Carbon Storage: Feebates

- ▶ Sliding scale of fees/rebates for increases/decreases in carbon storage

$$\text{fee} = \{\text{carbon storage}_{\text{base}} - \text{carbon storage}\} \cdot \text{price/ton stored carbon}$$

- ▶ Precedents

- ▶ Low CO₂ vehicles (e.g., Den., Fr., Ger., Maur., Neth., Nor., Swe., UK)

- ▶ Payment for ecosystem services (e.g., Costa Rica)

- ▶ Outline

- ▶ Rationale; design issues; limitations

Rationale: Economic Considerations

- ▶ Effectiveness and cost-effectiveness
 - ▶ Promotes carbon storage across all responses/landowners
 - ▶ Equalizes incremental costs across responses/landowners
- ▶ Avoids leakage (for landowners within national borders)
- ▶ Avoids fiscal costs
 - ▶ Baselines can be chosen so revenues from fees \approx rebate outlays
- ▶ Scaling up
 - ▶ Price can be aligned with emissions objectives

Rationale: Practical Considerations

▶ Administration

- ▶ Capacity for monitoring carbon storage for 47 countries under REDD+
- ▶ Finance ministry could apply fees/rebates using registry of landowners

▶ No need to assess additionality

- ▶ Baseline available for measuring changes in storage

▶ Potential support from landowners receiving rebates

Project-by-Project Approaches

- ▶ Effectiveness/cost-effectiveness/scaling up constrained by
 - ▶ Administrative costs from contracting
 - ▶ No automatic mechanism for prioritizing cost-effective projects
 - ▶ Need for finance
- ▶ May cause leakage from landowners not covered by projects

Design Issues

- ▶ Setting baseline for revenue-neutrality
 - ▶ REDD+ reference adjusted for (national level) expected:
 - ✓ Growth in BAU storage
 - ✓ Proportionate increase in carbon storage from feebate
- ▶ Payment formulas
 - ▶ Ideally annual: carbon storage price = CO₂ price × interest rate
 - ▶ In contrast, up-front payments require complex repayments if storage not permanent

Effectiveness of Carbon Pricing


Region	Annual CO2 sequestered, bn tonnes, 2030 from CO2 price	
	\$20/ton	\$50/ton
Non-annex 1 East Asia	0.5	1.0
Transition countries	0.6	1.0
Central/South America	1.4	2.5
Africa	1.3	1.7
Other Asia	1.2	1.7
Total	4.9	8.0

Source:
IPCC (2014).

Limitations: Land Ownership

Forest area by ownership category, 2010

- ▶ Most tropical forests publicly managed, but:
 - ▶ Marginal land (at agricultural border) most important
 - ▶ Forest ↔ farmland, tree plantations largely private
- ▶ Illegal logging, but:
 - ▶ Some NDCs (e.g., Brazil Bolivia) pledge to eliminate it



Source: Whiteman and others (2015).

Limitations: International Leakage

- ▶ Peer pressure may contain leakage (tracked through NDCs)
- ▶ Longer-term: international price floor for forestry emissions
 - ▶ Guarantees minimum effort, limits leakage
 - ▶ Met through feebate or other carbon pricing
 - ▶ Article 6.2 of Paris Agreement may help with participation/enforcement
 - ▶ May need to focus on effective carbon price if incomplete coverage